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The Risk Museum: I test trading-strategy ideas the way a quant desk would, on an engine I built, and I publish the ones that fail my gates. New here? Start at the entrance →

The Forecast Wing

pre-registered forecasts on modern mercantilism × AI

The fine print: revisions, conviction tiers, and the base-rate band

Priced 2026-07-21; dated revisions 2026-07-23 (log: 23a igv 29->35, btos 45->58; 23b adversarial pass wedge 33->34, nvda 39->34, igv 35->30, usg 45->52, sec301 72->83). AMENDMENT 2026-07-24: the revision window, originally closing 2026-07-25, is extended to 2026-07-30 — the week's evidence flow (chokepoint stress, a second open-model shock, major-bank rate views) warranted more updating time. Every revision remains dated and logged; CORRECTION 2026-07-28: F1 base_rate_current tier counts aligned to USTR's final-action fact sheet, 17 economies at the flat 10% (ban / ART commitment / partial regime), 43 at 12.5%, five partly net of MFN; evidence field only, probability and criteria unchanged. CORRECTION 2026-07-28b: F9 base_rate_current adds CY2023 (1,037t, WGC) so the consecutive-year count is checkable on the page; evidence field only. the slate freezes permanently when it is submitted to an external forecasting contest on 2026-07-30 — after that, no edits are possible. The base-rate band shown on each forecast is our reference-class estimate — how often events like this have happened historically — computed before we committed a probability, so you can see where our price agrees or disagrees. REVISION 2026-07-26: the original F1 (Sec 301 duties in effect on >=20 of 60 economies at 2026-12-31, priced 83) is RETIRED, not repriced. Its resolving event occurred on 2026-07-24 when duties took legal effect on all 60 economies, and a decided event does not belong in a forecast slate. It is replaced by a forward test of whether the wall survives deals and litigation, >=40 of 60 still in force at 2027-12-31, priced 70. The retirement is logged rather than hidden. Priced so far: 14/14.

Each forecast carries a declared conviction tier: CONVICTION (defended under pressure), AGAINST THE CROWD (a priced disagreement with consensus), DECLARED UNCERTAINTY (honestly near the coin, and saying so), or WORKING BOOK. Tiers follow the probabilities; if a price is revised before the freeze, its tier moves with it.

The revision log: every change, dated, in the open

The museum's macro wing: 13 binary forecasts on Modern Mercantilism, AI, and their intersection — the same pre-registration discipline the museum applies to trading strategies, pointed at the next five years. Objective resolution criteria; status tracked by the nightly pipeline. REVISION 2026-07-28c: slate narrowed 14 to 13 before the freeze. Withdrawn: china-chip-selfsuff-50 (third-party estimate stack too soft to headline), wgc-cb-gold-750t-2026 (WGC's own projection brackets the threshold, low information per Brier point), usg-equity-stakes-5-more-2028 (cross-loads the F3/F4 chokepoint driver). Added: xlu-igv-permission-rent-2029 (the rent-capture test the book lacked) and eu-gpai-enforcement-2027 (the non-US permission regime). All changes pre-submission; nothing had begun resolving. btos repriced 58 to 48, into its own band, shading survey-curve flattening below trend extrapolation. CORRECTION 2026-07-28d: F5 and F6 evidence fields add Apollo mid-year-outlook anchors (Slok, Jun-2026); evidence only, probabilities unchanged. CORRECTION 2026-07-28e (pre-freeze criteria repair, external red-team): F1 adds a 50% import-value floor so token residual duties cannot resolve YES; F10's vintage rule made symmetric (archived monthly vintages govern both YES and NO); F5 and F12 claim-descriptions rewritten from 'direct test' to the proxy/blunt-instrument descriptions they always were. Probabilities unchanged. REVISION 2026-07-28f (pre-freeze, merged from a second independent red-team build): slate widened 13 to 14 with seat-saas-economics-2030, a frozen 12-name cohort resolving on GAAP revenue growth and gross margin, the direct test of the seat thesis; F4 statement made identical to its dual resolver; F6 capex line defined (excludes acquisitions, finance leases; Microsoft calendarized); F7 result deadline extended to 2027-12-31 for postponement robustness; F11 pinned to the exact BTOS question with a successor rule; the EU forecast raised to a meaningful-action bar (Art. 92/93/101, an RFI alone does not count) and repriced 65 to 48 accordingly. All pre-submission; nothing had begun resolving. CORRECTION 2026-07-28g: F5 and F6 evidence fields add citations to Bridgewater's published AI-capex paper (Jan-2026); evidence only, probabilities unchanged.

The track record, measured not claimed

Before pricing these macro bets, the same engine made 620 predictions in a Jump Trading forecasting competition and was graded by a score, not a story. It came out calibrated (when it said 70%, things happened about 70% of the time) and finished in the top 6% of entrants.

0.231Brier score (0.25 = a coin flip; lower is better)
+7.6%better than chance
620forecasts graded
top 6%finish, all entrants
predicted %happened %

The curve is the proof at a glance. Each dot is a group of forecasts, and the closer it sits to the dashed line, the better the calibration. My own misses are left in: a little underconfident in the middle, overconfident on a few near-certain calls.

One honest caveat: that competition was on soccer. It proves the method is calibrated and honest, not that the macro calls below are right. Those get their own score when they resolve (2026–2030). how the scoring works →

The Observatory

the chokepoints, watched nightly · as of 2026-07-28
Strait of Hormuzbaseline oil transit ~21 mbd (EIA); no disruption signal · curator's note: crossings ~90% below prior-year norms since early March (brief June recovery failed); 3-2-1 crack spread ~$70/bbl, ~2x the 2023-25 range; SPR drained to ~320mn bbl, lowest since the mid-1980s; total US crude storage below every recent year (per Apollo chief economist's charts, 7/22) (2026-07-23) · informs: energy risk premium; the monetary-order clusterthe forecast ↓
Taiwan Straitno elevated signal · informs: the chip-control regime clusterthe forecast ↓
Strait of Malaccabaseline oil transit ~17.2 mbd (EIA); no disruption signal · informs: China trade flows; the magnet chokepoint callthe forecast ↓
Suez Canalbaseline oil transit ~7.6 mbd (EIA); no disruption signal · informs: rerouting = the 'legal but leaky' tariff wedgethe forecast ↓
Panama Canalbaseline oil transit ~0.9 mbd (EIA); no disruption signal · informs: hemisphere trade; the tariff-wedge callthe forecast ↓
signals via the museum's self-hosted world-monitoring stack + public feeds · monitoring only · forecast resolutions come from primary sources

The live book · pre-registered bets, five themes, resolution order within each

ForecastTierPBandExpressed viaCrowdingResolves
Trade & the tariff rebuild2 of 14
The tariff wall holds, or the deals dismantle…conviction70%60–80%Macro — no clean sleevesemi-crowded2027-12-31
Statutory vs collected, the wedgecontrarian34%25–45%Macro — no clean sleeveuncrowded2028-03-31
China chokepoints & chips2 of 14
Magnet flows, the chokepoint in a customs linecontrarian21%15–35%Rare-earth miners (REMX)uncrowded2028-02-28
The double-veto chip tradebook34%25–45%Semis (NVDA, SOXX)uncrowded2028-03-31
The AI buildout, capex & power4 of 14
The +140bp claim, tested in the national acco…conviction66%55–70%AI-capex complexsemi-crowded2027-03-31
Is scarcity pricing structural?conviction72%55–75%Power / IPPs (CEG, VST)semi-crowded2027-12-31
The first measurable signature of a bustbook62%50–65%Hyperscalers + semissemi-crowded2028-03-15
Does the permission holder keep the rent?book40%28–45%Macro — no clean sleevelow2030-03-31
The monetary order2 of 14
Where the collision pricescontrarian55%55–75%Long-end rates (steepener)semi-crowded2028-06-30
Level vs share, the contrarian readbook60%50–65%USTs / rates (TLT)uncrowded2028-08-31
The state & the real economy4 of 14
Does the second permission regime act?book48%40–60%Macro — no clean sleevelow2028-01-31
Buildout vs adoption, measuredbook48%35–55%Broad AI adoption — diffuseuncrowded2029-01-31
The 82% survival betbook30%15–30%Software (IGV) shortsemi-crowded2029-12-31
Does the SaaS tail preserve its public-equity…book58%55–80%Macro — no clean sleevelow2030-06-30

Effective breadth: 14 forecasts across 10 clusters, no cluster carrying more than two, with three cross-loads. They are correlated, so the honest independent count is closer to seven than 14, and seven is what I claim. Skill compounds with the root of independent bets, and I will not pretend these are 14 of them. The scoreboard is the Brier score, reported when each forecast resolves.

Each forecast in full

Reading each gauge below: the shaded bar is the base-rate range (how often things like this have happened historically, set before I priced it); the marker is my committed probability, and it turns blue when it sits outside that range (I’m taking a view); Brier if YES / if NO is the score the call earns under each outcome, where 0 is perfect and lower is better.

Trade & the tariff rebuild

The tariff wall holds, or the deals dismantle it convictionP = 70%

On 2027-12-31, Section 301 forced-labor duties of at least 10% ad valorem remain in legal effect on imports from at least 40 of the 60 economies covered by USTR's 2026 final action.

P = 70%base rate 60–80%Brier if YES 0.09 · if NO 0.49

open   resolves by 2027-12-31 · source: Federal Register; USTR; CIT/CAFC/SCOTUS dockets · base-rate band: 60-80% · crowding: semi-crowded · cluster: US tariff legal rebuild · expressed via: Macro — no clean sleeve

latest: duties in force on all 60 economies since 2026-07-24; 21+ must fall away by 2027-12-31 for NO; litigation and compliance-relief watch

Resolution criteria (binding)

Resolves YES if, as of 11:59pm ET on 2027-12-31, an additional ad valorem duty of at least 10% imposed under USTR's Section 301 forced-labor proceeding (dockets USTR-2026-0265/-0266; affirmative determinations 2026-06-02; final action 2026-07-23; effective 12:01am ET 2026-07-24) is then in legal effect on imports from at least 40 distinct economies, AND the economies still covered accounted for at least 50% of the original 60-economy group's calendar-2025 US goods imports (US Census/USITC country import values, first-published annual figures). Both conditions must hold; the import-value floor prevents token residual coverage from counting as a standing wall. Counting rules: (a) economies as USTR enumerates them, EU counts as one; (b) an economy counts only if the duty under THIS proceeding is then in force, meaning it has not been terminated, has not been suspended for any reason including an executive agreement, trade deal, or compliance determination, has not been reduced below 10%, and is not vacated, stayed, or universally enjoined by a court order then in effect; plaintiff-specific relief does not disqualify an economy; (c) the 10% threshold is this proceeding's rate alone, never stacked with Section 122/232/338, IEEPA or successor, or other 301 dockets; (d) partial product coverage qualifies; (e) suspended duties do NOT count, whether or not the suspension is later reversed. Fewer than 40 qualifying economies at that moment resolves NO. Resolve from the Federal Register, USTR releases, and CIT/CAFC/SCOTUS dockets.

Base rate / current: SCOTUS voided the IEEPA tariffs 6-3 on 2026-02-20, demonstrating live judicial risk to tariff authority. USTR made affirmative determinations in all 60 forced-labor investigations on 2026-06-02, took final action 2026-07-23, and duties took legal effect 2026-07-24 as the Section 122 stopgap lapsed. Seventeen economies carry the flat 10% rate, reached through an existing forced-labor import ban, an Agreement on Reciprocal Trade commitment, or a partial regime (USTR final-action fact sheet); the other 43 carry 12.5%, five of them partly net of MFN. Affected governments began filing challenges immediately. The 2018-19 China Section 301 lists survived their court challenges.

What it tests: Modern Mercantilism is durable or negotiable. The wall was rebuilt on statutory authority within a day of the Section 122 lapse; the open question is whether deals and courts dismantle it faster than it was built.

Statutory vs collected, the wedge against the crowdP = 34%

US calculated duties as a share of customs value of goods imports for consumption exceed 9.0% for calendar year 2027.

P = 34%base rate 25–45%Brier if YES 0.44 · if NO 0.12

open   resolves by 2028-03-31 · source: USITC DataWeb / US Census · base-rate band: 25-45% · crowding: uncrowded · cluster: US tariff legal rebuild · expressed via: Macro — no clean sleeve

latest: 7.2% collected (May 2026, PWBM) vs 9.0% threshold for CY2027

Resolution criteria (binding)

Total calculated duties divided by total customs value, imports for consumption, all countries and commodities, CY2027, from USITC DataWeb (Census source data). Vintage: the annual figure as retrievable after the December-2027 statistical month first publishes (~early Feb 2028) and on or before 2028-03-31; later revisions ignored. Unrounded ratio; YES iff strictly >9.0% (exactly 9.0% = NO). This is the calculated-duties measure (PWBM tracker basis), NOT Treasury/CBP cash collections — refunds do not enter. If DataWeb is unavailable: official Census imports-for-consumption data with calculated-duty and customs-value fields (USA Trade Online); never collections data. If December 2027 is unpublished by 2028-03-31: the same ratio over cumulative CY2027 year-to-date months available.

Base rate / current: Yale statutory rate ~11.8% pre-substitution vs 7.2% collected (May 2026, PWBM), a 3-4.6pp wedge from exemptions, substitution, and transshipment. Pre-2025 baseline was 2.3%.

What it tests: Tariffs as a durable revenue and rebalancing instrument — tested at the cash register, not the announcement.

China chokepoints & chips

Magnet flows, the chokepoint in a customs line against the crowdP = 21%

China's CY2027 exports of metal permanent magnets (HS 8505.11, containing sintered NdFeB) to the US exceed its 2022-2024 annual average tonnage in GACC data.

P = 21%base rate 15–35%Brier if YES 0.62 · if NO 0.04

open   resolves by 2028-02-28 · source: China GACC (fallback: US Census) · base-rate band: 15-35% · crowding: uncrowded · cluster: China truce / chokepoints · expressed via: Rare-earth miners (REMX)

latest: H1-2026 flows ~20% below 2022-24 avg

Resolution criteria (binding)

Primary: China GACC (stats.customs.gov.cn), exports to the US under HS 8505.11 (sum of all Chinese 8-digit children incl. 8505.1110), kg converted to tonnes. YES if the CY2027 total (first GACC release covering full-year 2027) strictly exceeds the mean of CY2022/2023/2024 annual totals as displayed on the same platform at resolution; equal or lower = NO. First-retrieved figures govern. Fallback: if GACC has not published CY2027 country-level 8505.11 by 2028-02-21, or has discontinued/reclassified the line for 2022-2027, use US Census general imports from China, HS 8505.11 (USA Trade Online, customs quantity), identical comparison within the Census series. Resolution date 2028-02-28.

Base rate / current: H1-2026 flows still ~20% below the 2022-24 average despite the truce; extraterritorial controls postponed only one year; the reciprocal-tariff suspension expires 2026-11-10; US demand substitution is ramping.

What it tests: Weaponized interdependence — chokepoints as standing instruments of statecraft. The purest Mercantilism x AI collision visible in a single customs line.

The double-veto chip trade working bookP = 34%

In any covered quarter from FY2027 Q2 through FY2028 Q4, Nvidia reports either at least $2.5 billion of China and Hong Kong geographic revenue or at least $2.0 billion of explicitly identified China data-center revenue.

P = 34%base rate 25–45%Brier if YES 0.44 · if NO 0.12

open   resolves by 2028-03-31 · source: Nvidia Form 10-Q/10-K geographic revenue; CFO Commentary · base-rate band: 25-45% · crowding: uncrowded · cluster: China truce / chokepoints · expressed via: Semis (NVDA, SOXX)

latest: zero China DC revenue as of Q1 FY27; next earnings late Aug 2026

Resolution criteria (binding)

Covered quarters end after 2026-07-21 and on or before 2028-01-31. PRIMARY: China including Hong Kong geographic revenue in a Form 10-Q or 10-K is at least $2.5B for one covered quarter. SECONDARY: Nvidia explicitly states China data-center revenue of at least $2.0B for one covered quarter in CFO commentary or prepared remarks. Qualitative language does not count. A restatement published by 2028-03-31 governs symmetrically. If neither condition is met, NO.

Base rate / current: $4.6B/quarter pre-ban went to zero; two US approvals (H20 with 15% revenue share, H200 with 25% surcharge) produced zero deliveries. Beijing buy-local directives block purchases; B30A unapproved; guidance assumes no China DC revenue.

What it tests: Is US-China tech trade a negotiable toll regime or a structural mutual embargo? Both capitals now hold a veto — the uncrowded read.

The AI buildout, capex & power

The +140bp claim, tested in the national accounts convictionP = 66%

The combined contribution of Information Processing Equipment plus Software to US real GDP growth for CY2026 (annual-average basis, BEA NIPA Table 1.5.2) is >=1.00 percentage points.

P = 66%base rate 55–70%Brier if YES 0.12 · if NO 0.44

open   resolves by 2027-03-31 · source: BEA NIPA Table 1.5.2 · base-rate band: 55-70% · crowding: semi-crowded · cluster: AI capex cycle · expressed via: AI-capex complex

latest: Q2-2026 advance estimate 2026-07-30

Resolution criteria (binding)

Sum the published annual-2026 contribution lines for 'Information processing equipment' (parent line under Equipment) and 'Software' (under Intellectual Property Products) in BEA NIPA Table 1.5.2. Annual-frequency figure (2026 average over 2025 average), not Q4/Q4. Governing vintage: the Q4-2026 third estimate (late March 2027) if published by 2027-03-31; else the most recent BEA release with annual-2026 data by that date; else the first release ever containing it. Later revisions ignored. Published two-decimal values summed, no re-rounding; exactly 1.00 = YES, <=0.99 = NO. Renamed lines resolve to successor lines; a renumbered table resolves to the successor expanded-detail contributions table.

Base rate / current: A widely-circulated institutional estimate (Jan 2026) puts AI capex contribution at ~+140bp to 2026 growth. The observable equipment+software lines contributed ~0.8-1.0pp in 2025 vs a ~0.3-0.5pp pre-2023 decade norm. >=1.00pp is dot-com-peak territory. Apollo's mid-year outlook (Slok, Jun-2026) independently puts AI spending's GDP lift near 1pp, a second named house on the same line the accounts must confirm. Bridgewater's own published estimate (Jensen, DeBois & Zimbler, The Macro Implications of the AI Capex Boom, Jan-2026): ~140bp of 2026 US growth and ~150bp of 2027, with their caveat that a material part is chipmaker profit unlikely to be recycled into the economy.

What it tests: A deliberately broad national-accounts proxy for the AI investment cycle, the closest public series to the most-cited institutional claim of the cycle. A YES supports the capex-boom thesis; it does not isolate AI's own contribution.

Is scarcity pricing structural? convictionP = 72%

PJM's 2029/2030 Base Residual Auction clears RTO-wide at or above $325.00/MW-day, a fourth consecutive scarcity print.

P = 72%base rate 55–75%Brier if YES 0.08 · if NO 0.52

open   resolves by 2027-12-31 · source: PJM BRA results (pjm.com) · base-rate band: 55-75% · crowding: semi-crowded · cluster: Power chokepoint · expressed via: Power / IPPs (CEG, VST)

latest: 2029/30 BRA closes 2026-12-15

Resolution criteria (binding)

Resolves YES if PJM's official 2029/30 Base Residual Auction results (report or news release on pjm.com) show an RTO-wide clearing price of $325.00/MW-day or higher, nominal, UCAP, as reported; exactly $325.00 counts. The at-cap language used elsewhere is descriptive only; this threshold governs. The auction is scheduled to close 2026-12-15. If PJM has not published official 2029/30 BRA results by 2027-12-31, whether through postponement, redesign or suspension, resolves NO. Latest official PJM figures as of 2027-03-31 govern.

Base rate / current: Cap hit three-for-three (2026/27 $329.17; 2027/28 $333.44; 2028/29 $325.00). Supply cannot respond by 2029/30: interconnection request-to-COD >4 years, turbine lead times 6-8 years, major turbine vendors sold out through 2030; datacenter demand growing ~5%/yr in commercial sales. Cap provenance: PA Gov. Shapiro's Dec-2024 FERC complaint led to the Jan-2025 PJM settlement (cap $325/MW-day, floor $175), FERC-approved Apr-2025 and extended Apr-2026 through the next two auctions, so the 2029/30 BRA prices under the same authored ceiling; PA claims $18.2B cumulative consumer savings (pa.gov, Jul-15-2026).

What it tests: AI capex as a durable macro force — tested at its most binding physical constraint (power), not at the spending line.

The first measurable signature of a bust working bookP = 62%

Combined CY2027 capital expenditure of Microsoft, Alphabet, Amazon, and Meta exceeds combined CY2026 capex by >=20%.

P = 62%base rate 50–65%Brier if YES 0.14 · if NO 0.38

open   resolves by 2028-03-15 · source: SEC EDGAR · base-rate band: 50-65% · crowding: semi-crowded · cluster: AI capex cycle · expressed via: Hyperscalers + semis

latest: CY2026 guidance ~$500B+; Q2 earnings late Jul 2026

Resolution criteria (binding)

For each company, use the consolidated cash-flow line reporting cash paid for additions or purchases of property and equipment, or its direct successor line. Exclude finance-lease principal, acquisitions, and noncash additions. Calendarize Microsoft by summing the four calendar quarters; use calendar-year filings for Alphabet, Amazon, and Meta. YES if the CY2027 sum is at least 1.20 times CY2026. Restatements filed by 2028-03-15 govern symmetrically; if a company ceases filing, use the latest official filings for both years and apply the same treatment to numerator and denominator.

Base rate / current: CY2025 combined ~$380-400B; CY2026 guidance ~$500B+; the series has never declined year-over-year since 2015; the telecom analog flipped to -40% in year five (2001). The 2025 tax act's 100% immediate expensing subsidizes the marginal data-center dollar into 2027, a fiscal tailwind under the capex line (Apollo mid-year outlook, Jun-2026). Component scarcity corroborates persistence: SK Hynix has stated it is sold out of all memory capacity until 2027 (cited in the same Bridgewater paper).

What it tests: Compute +60%/yr and capex-boom continuation; a miss below +20% is the first falsifiable signature of the bust chapter the consensus macro view warns about.

Does the permission holder keep the rent? working bookP = 40%

Over 2027-2029, XLU (utilities) delivers a cumulative NAV total return at least 5.00 percentage points greater than IGV (software), the book's own thesis priced as one market test.

P = 40%base rate 28–45%Brier if YES 0.36 · if NO 0.16

open   resolves by 2030-03-31 · source: Sponsor standardized returns (SSGA / iShares) · base-rate band: 28-45% · crowding: low · cluster: Permission-rent capture · expressed via: Macro — no clean sleeve

latest: Window opens 2026-12-31; XLU over IGV +25.4pp trailing 3y (pre-window)

Resolution criteria (binding)

Window: 2026-12-31 close to 2029-12-31 close, dividends reinvested, net of expenses. PRIMARY RESOLVER: each sponsor's standardized 3-year average annual NAV total return as of the 2029-12-31 quarter-end (sectorspdrs.com/ssga.com for XLU, ishares.com for IGV), converted cum=(1+r)^3-1; resolves YES if XLU_cum - IGV_cum >= +5.00pp. First published vintage governs. Fallbacks in order: successor fund of an acquiring sponsor; S&P DJI gross index total returns for the underlying indices; Bloomberg adjusted closes. Hard deadline 2030-03-31; if no qualifying data by then, resolves NO.

Base rate / current: Computed, not asserted: 265 rolling monthly 3-year windows Jul-2004 to Jul-2026, XLU beat IGV by >=5.00pp in 27.9%; 22 calendar Dec-Dec windows, 7 of 22 = 31.8%; effective independent sample ~7 windows, standard error roughly +/-15pp. Five of the seven historical YES windows start inside the dot-com unwind. The trade has already run: XLU over IGV +25.4pp trailing 3y through Jul-2026. Both legs fee-inclusive.

What it tests: The thesis's own market test: if permission is the scarce asset, its holders should out-earn its renters.

The monetary order

Where the collision prices against the crowdP = 55%

The NY Fed's ACM 10-year term premium (ACMTP10) prints >=1.00% on five consecutive trading days at some point between 2027-01-01 and 2028-06-30.

P = 55%base rate 55–75%Brier if YES 0.20 · if NO 0.30

open   resolves by 2028-06-30 · source: NY Fed ACM daily series (ACMTP10; designated ACM successor only) · base-rate band: 55-75% · crowding: semi-crowded · cluster: US fiscal / rates · expressed via: Long-end rates (steepener)

latest: ACMTP10 0.66% (2026-07-27) vs 1.00% threshold

Resolution criteria (binding)

YES if the published daily ACMTP10 series shows unrounded values >=1.00 (percent) on 5 consecutive observations dated within the window (endpoints inclusive); weekends/holidays/data gaps do not break a run. Vintage handling (the series is re-estimated), symmetric by design: the then-current vintage is archived on the last business day of each month during the window; YES if any archived vintage shows a qualifying streak dated within the window, NO otherwise. Later re-estimation cannot create a YES or reverse one; both outcomes settle on the same archived record. If the NY Fed discontinues ACMTP10 but publishes a designated successor to the ACM term-premium estimate, that successor governs on the same threshold and rules. No substitution to a different model family is permitted, because this forecast is priced on where ACM sits relative to models that already print higher; substituting one of those would decide the question by choice of estimator. If ACMTP10 is discontinued with no ACM successor, resolves NO.

Base rate / current: ~0.47-0.73% (Jun-Jul 2026), the first sustained positive stretch since 2023; 30y yield >5.1%; ~$10T of Treasuries rolling over in 2026; deficits ~5.8% of GDP; pre-2014 the series regularly sat above 1.5%.

What it tests: Where Treasury supply meeting shrinking structural demand would first become measurable, the fade of the repricing consensus's confidence rather than its direction.

Level vs share, the contrarian read working bookP = 60%

Total foreign holdings of US Treasuries (TIC Major Foreign Holders 'Grand Total', first print) reach >=$10 trillion for any data month from July 2026 through June 2028.

P = 60%base rate 50–65%Brier if YES 0.16 · if NO 0.36

open   resolves by 2028-08-31 · source: US Treasury TIC MFH table · base-rate band: 50-65% · crowding: uncrowded · cluster: Monetary order · expressed via: USTs / rates (TLT)

latest: ~$9,370B (May-2026 first print) vs $10,000B threshold [MANUAL fallback]

Resolution criteria (binding)

YES if the Grand Total of the Treasury's mfh.txt table is >= $10,000.0B as published to one decimal for any data month July 2026 through June 2028, using the FIRST publication of that month (a new month appears in the release ~mid month+2). Revisions and benchmark restatements ignored. mfh.txt is overwritten in place — first prints are verified contemporaneously or via a release-date archive (e.g. Wayback); the archived first print governs. A renamed table resolves to the successor total-foreign-UST line. The June-2028 print is scheduled ~2028-08-17. NO if no qualifying first print by 2028-08-31; publication delays do not extend the window; later-published figures do not count.

Base rate / current: All TIC figures here are first prints as published by the US Treasury, vintage stated for each. ~$9.2T (Dec-2025 data month), +$1.5T over four years (~+$375B/yr) even as China exits (~-$0.7T) and the foreign share of federal debt falls; ~$9,370B (May-2026 data month, first print); record $9,490B (Feb-2026 data month). Trend crosses $10T ~mid-2028, window-edge by design. No figure here is older than Dec-2025.

What it tests: The flow side of 'foreign demand for US debt is structurally weakening' — tested in the level series the de-dollarization debate ignores in favor of share data.

The state & the real economy

Does the second permission regime act? working bookP = 48%

By 2027-12-31, the European Commission publicly begins an Article 92 GPAI model evaluation, adopts an Article 93 measure, or imposes an Article 101 fine against a named GPAI provider.

P = 48%base rate 40–60%Brier if YES 0.27 · if NO 0.23

open   resolves by 2028-01-31 · source: European Commission publications · base-rate band: 40-60% · crowding: low · cluster: Non-US permission regime · expressed via: Macro — no clean sleeve

latest: Enforcement powers switch on 2026-08-02; no qualifying step yet; Art. 52(6) list unpublished

Resolution criteria (binding)

A named provider must be the subject of a Commission publication announcing an Article 92 model evaluation, an Article 93 corrective/interim/market-restriction measure, or an Article 101 fine under the AI Act GPAI regime. An Article 91 request for information alone, guidelines, speeches, national-authority action, or DSA/DMA/competition action does not count. First publication controls; publication grace through 2028-01-31 applies only to an action dated on or before 2027-12-31.

Base rate / current: Commission GPAI enforcement powers switch on 2026-08-02 (fines to 3% of worldwide turnover or EUR 15m). Analogues: DMA gatekeeper deadline 2024-03-07 to named proceedings in 18 days; DSA VLOP obligations Aug-2023 to formal proceedings against X in ~4 months; first DSA non-compliance fine EUR 120m, 2025-12-05. Against: no official AI Act case register, the Art. 52(6) systemic-risk list remains unpublished as of 2026-07-27, and the 2027-08-02 grace period shrinks the enforceable population.

What it tests: Regulatory mercantilism at the model layer, held to a meaningful-action bar: an information request alone does not count.

Buildout vs adoption, measured working bookP = 48%

The firm-weighted share of US businesses reporting current AI use in the Census Bureau's BTOS survey reaches >=25.0% in any biweekly period ending by 2028-12-31.

P = 48%base rate 35–55%Brier if YES 0.27 · if NO 0.23

open   resolves by 2029-01-31 · source: US Census BTOS public files · base-rate band: 35-55% · crowding: uncrowded · cluster: AI adoption / disruption · expressed via: Broad AI adoption — diffuse

latest: 19.8% (period ending 2026-05-03) vs 25.0% threshold [MANUAL]

Resolution criteria (binding)

YES if any national firm-weighted BTOS estimate for the question labeled business currently using AI in producing goods or services is at least 25.0% for a period ending on or before 2028-12-31 and published by 2029-01-31. The employment-weighted series and future-use question do not count. A successor item counts only if Census explicitly identifies it in release notes or metadata as the continuation of that current-use series; otherwise the original series controls and discontinuation without a qualifying print resolves NO. Exactly 25.0% is YES.

Base rate / current: ~3.9% (fall 2023) → ~9% (2025, old wording); the Nov-2025 rewording lifted the level to ~18% at end-2025; 19.8% at the period ending 2026-05-03, the gap to 25% is ~5pp on the governing series.

What it tests: The buildout-vs-adoption pricing gap: YES = adoption arriving fast enough to justify the capex; NO = the gap persists into 2029 — the bubble-scenario precondition.

The 82% survival bet working bookP = 30%

The iShares software ETF (IGV) underperforms SPY by >=25 percentage points in cumulative NAV total return from 2026-12-31 to 2029-12-31.

P = 30%base rate 15–30%Brier if YES 0.49 · if NO 0.09

open   resolves by 2029-12-31 · source: iShares/SSGA NAV total-return data; S&P DJ Indices fallback · base-rate band: 15-30% · crowding: semi-crowded · cluster: AI adoption / disruption · expressed via: Software (IGV) short

latest: pre-window (starts 2026-12-31); IGV vs SPY YTD spread: -22.4pp (2026-07-28, adj-close proxy)

Resolution criteria (binding)

YES if IGV cumulative NAV total return minus SPY cumulative NAV total return over the window is <= -25.0pp (exactly -25.0 = YES). Primary: each issuer's published 3-year average annual NAV total return as of 2029-12-31 (ishares.com / ssga.com), cumulative = ((1+r)^3 - 1) x 100, difference unrounded. If either figure is not published by 2030-01-31: chain issuer daily NAV with distributions reinvested on ex-date (Morningstar NAV TR is an acceptable equivalent). First figures published after 2029-12-31 govern. Fund closure/merger/delisting → chain-link the realized fund return with the total-return benchmark index (S&P North American Expanded Technology Software TR / S&P 500 TR or successors) through 2029-12-31.

Base rate / current: A -25pp three-year sector shortfall vs the S&P is roughly a 1-in-5 event given 10-15%/yr tracking error; SaaS multiples already de-rated through 2025-26.

What it tests: A deliberately blunt index-level expression of the seat-repricing thesis. IGV contains the platforms that own the disruption, so this is not a direct test of the seat-priced tail; the tail argument lives in Section II.5 and resolves on economics, not this spread.

Does the SaaS tail preserve its public-equity economics? working bookP = 58%

Four or fewer companies in a frozen 12-name seat-priced application-software cohort remain independently public and report both at least 10% year-over-year revenue growth and at least 70% GAAP gross margin in their final qualifying fiscal year.

P = 58%base rate 55–80%Brier if YES 0.18 · if NO 0.34

open   resolves by 2030-06-30 · source: SEC Forms 10-K/20-F and exchange listings · base-rate band: 55-80% · crowding: low · cluster: Seat-cohort fundamentals · expressed via: Macro — no clean sleeve

latest: Cohort frozen at submission; 12 of 12 currently listed; first qualifying FYs begin 2029

Resolution criteria (binding)

Frozen cohort at submission: Asana, Atlassian, Box, DocuSign, Dropbox, Freshworks, GitLab, monday.com, PagerDuty, RingCentral, Sprout Social, and Zoom Communications. An issuer passes only if (a) substantially the same operating company remains independently listed on a US exchange at 2029-12-31, and (b) its latest fiscal year ending from 2029-01-01 through 2030-03-31, filed by 2030-06-30, reports GAAP revenue growth of at least 10.0% year over year and GAAP gross margin of at least 70.0% (gross profit divided by revenue if not stated). Acquisition, take-private, liquidation, or delisting fails the independence gate; a renamed public successor counts. YES if four or fewer of 12 pass all gates. This is one joint cohort outcome; no marginal probabilities are multiplied.

Base rate / current: All 12 names independently listed as of 2026-07-28, chosen for seat-priced exposure before outcomes were knowable. The II.5 gate rates imply 2.6-4.2 of 12 passing all gates; all-software median net retention has fallen from 123 (early 2022) toward 105, and the public-software universe has been shrinking at roughly a tenth a year through take-privates and acquisitions.

What it tests: The direct test the index spread cannot give: a frozen, pre-registered 12-name cohort resolving on GAAP lines, one joint outcome, no multiplied marginals.