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The Risk Museum: an autonomous AI pipeline tests trading-strategy ideas the way a quant desk would, and publishes the ones that fail its gates. New here? Start at the entrance →

The Trading Floor

a disclosed, risk-budgeted paper book, where the exhibit is the discipline

Equity curve

10012014016020082012201620202024inception 2026-07-25 → live

Paper-book NAV, linear scale, starts at 100. Dashed blue is the transparent pre-inception backtest (2006–2026); the solid live track begins at the inception line on the right and accrues nightly, so the forward record is only just beginning.

Desk blotter

Risk first. Where the book sits against its own limits today.

Pod stateFULLexposure ×1.0 · no de-risk trigger active
Current drawdown-3.9%
51.5% of the way to the -7.5% flatten line, measured from the year’s high
Max drawdown-18.8%on the traded book · vs -28.5% on the full-risk reference (unmanaged)
Gross leverage1.47x
of the 2.0x cap
Realized vol6.8%
vs the 10.0% vol target

The overlay runs a drawdown budget the way a platform runs a pod. Inside a calendar year the book cuts to half weight once it is 5.0% below the year’s high, and goes flat at 7.5%. The budget resets each January and the book trades again. So the within-year drawdown stays near 7.5%, while the all-time figure (-18.8%) can run past it across a long decline, when two annual budgets stack through the same bear.

A hard stop measured from the all-time peak would be a trap. A book taken to cash cannot climb back to an old high on its own, so it sits out the whole recovery. Harvey and co-authors document exactly this in “Drawdowns” (2020). Budgeting the limit by year is how a real desk holds the floor without killing the book.

What the overlay costs, plainly. Holding the traded max drawdown to -18.8% against the unmanaged -28.5% meant giving up return and time in market. The book sat in cash on about 15% of all days (~778), the price of the stop. Month by month the book keeps about 79% of the unmanaged book’s up months and takes only 72% of its down months, so the overlay sheds more downside than upside.

Annualized return 2.6% · Sharpe 0.41 · hit rate 45.7% of all days, or 54.0% on invested days · best day +2.7% / worst day -2.6%
Modest by design. A 10% vol cap and an annual drawdown stop trade return for a floor, and on a survivorship-biased universe the Sharpe is an upper bound, not a target.

Diversification

Why ten desks under one roof run at lower risk than any desk alone. Add up each sleeve’s own volatility, weighted by how much of the book it carries, and you get 18.1%. The combined book realizes just 7.7%, because the desks do not move together. That gap is the diversification a multi-manager platform is built to harvest, and the whole case for running many uncorrelated sleeves instead of one big bet.

Diversification ratio 2.35× · weighted-average desk vol 18.1% → book vol 7.7% · average pairwise |correlation| 0.29
Full-sample and unlevered, before the 10% vol target and the drawdown overlay. Correlations are pairwise on at least a year of overlap.
123456789101. Equity β1-.66+.60+.01-.28-.07-.12-.11-.11-.192. Low-vol / BAB-.661-.39+.06+.49+.19+.30+.25+.24+.403. Trend+.60-.391+.14-.01+.04+.06-.04+.08-.014. TMT+.01+.06+.141+.39+.33+.45+.28+.43+.335. Financials-.28+.49-.01+.391+.36+.55+.34+.47+.526. Healthcare-.07+.19+.04+.33+.361+.35+.25+.41+.317. Industrials-.12+.30+.06+.45+.55+.351+.43+.50+.508. Energy / Mat-.11+.25-.04+.28+.34+.25+.431+.34+.369. Consumer-.11+.24+.08+.43+.47+.41+.50+.341+.4210. Util / RE-.19+.40-.01+.33+.52+.31+.50+.36+.421

Pairwise correlation of the ten desks’ daily returns. Red = move together, blue = move opposite, stronger colour = stronger link. Low-vol / BAB is -0.66 to equity beta, a built-in hedge that fires exactly when beta hurts. The seven sector desks share one momentum factor and cluster in low-to-mid red, which is why the allocator budgets them as a single group and never lets the cluster swamp the book. Uncorrelated sleeves are the engine; the 2.35× ratio is what they buy.

Risk dashboard

Computed at render from the book’s daily returns and the Fama-French factor data. These are the tilts the book means to carry, and the tail it accepts.

Desk risk budget & attribution
DeskRisk weightStd. SharpeContribution
Systematic desks
Equity beta (SPY)20.6%+0.64+58.8%
Low-vol / BAB8.8%-0.68-38.3%
Trend (TSMOM)20.6%+0.77+57.4%
Systematic subtotal50.0%+77.9%
Sector long/short desks
TMT L/S2.2%+0.05+4.4%
Financials L/S6.6%-0.18+6.6%
Healthcare L/S8.0%-0.31-9.0%
Industrials L/S7.5%-0.11+4.8%
Energy & Materials L/S5.9%+0.00+6.5%
Consumer L/S7.8%-0.07+1.4%
Utilities & Real Estate L/S11.9%-0.12+7.5%
Sector subtotal50.0%+22.2%
Commoditiesroadmap
Global macro (rates, FX)roadmap
Creditroadmap
Book (ex-ante, diversified)100.0%+0.41100.0%

The platform splits risk 50.0% to the systematic desks and 50.0% to the sector long/short desks, then runs inverse-vol within each group, so no desk can swamp the book. Contribution is each desk’s share of the book’s return and sums to 100%. The directional and trend desks carry the return, while the sector long/short desks earn little on their own but decorrelate the book, which is why its SPY correlation is only 0.31. Standalone Sharpes are backtest figures on a survivorship-biased universe, so they are upper bounds. Commodities, global macro, and credit are real platform desks that need data outside this US-equity universe, shown as roadmap rather than faked.

Tail risk: historical VaR & expected shortfall
ConfidenceVaRExp. shortfall
1-day 99%-1.23%-1.63%
1-day 95%-0.73%-1.06%

Empirical (non-parametric) 1-day figures over 5,050 daily book returns; a loss, not a forecast. Expected shortfall is the average loss in the tail beyond VaR.

Factor exposures: FF5 + momentum regression
FactorBetat-stat
Mkt-RF+0.16+40.4
SMB-0.05-6.5
HML+0.02+2.4
RMW-0.02-1.9
CMA-0.04-3.2
Mom+0.25+52.8
Alpha (ann.)-1.1%-1.0
0.47

Excess daily book return regressed on the Fama-French 5 factors plus momentum (Ken French daily data), 5,011 overlapping days, 2006-06-28 to 2026-05-29. The French factors publish on a lag, so this regression ends 2026-05-29 while everything else on the floor is as-of 2026-07-27. The book is what it says it is: a long market beta (Mkt-RF +0.16) and a trend/momentum tilt (Mom +0.25), with a large-cap tilt (negative SMB, since this is a big-cap universe) the only other significant loading; value, profitability and investment betas are statistical zeros. R² 0.47 leaves most of the variance idiosyncratic. SPY correlation 0.31 corroborates the market beta. The annualized alpha is negative and insignificant (t -1.0). On a survivorship-biased universe, treat it as an upper bound.

What this is, plainly. Disclosed, risk-managed paper book (PAPER/SIM only, not a broker). The universe is survivorship-biased, so the Sharpe is an upper bound; the exhibit is the risk discipline, not the raw return. The vault (the museum’s surviving edges) is deliberately withheld here. They are proprietary risk-forecasting signals, and a live edge decays the moment it is broadcast; what you see on this floor is a fully-disclosed book, and not showing the rest is the discipline, not an omission. PAPER / SIMULATION only: no broker, no real capital, no order ever leaves this machine, and nothing here is investment advice. Every figure is deterministic and point-in-time. Features at time t use only data through t, with a further trading lag. The universe is survivorship-biased, so every Sharpe and every alpha is an upper bound. Everything dated before 2026-07-25 is backtest; everything after is live and forward.