Keywords: risk decomposition, factor exposure, portfolio concentration, value-at-risk, expected shortfall, long/short equity.

A portfolio’s dollar description and its risk description are different objects. This note takes one hypothetical long/short book, ten large caps in the US, six long and four short, gross 100% and net +30%, and decomposes it the way a multi-manager risk desk decomposes a new manager’s positions. Weights are constant and rebalanced daily; the daily return is regressed on the Fama–French five factors plus Carhart momentum with Newey–West standard errors.

Three things the dollars hide. Net exposure of +30% carries a realized market beta of 0.56, roughly 1.9× the direction those dollars imply, because every short is a low-beta defensive. NVDA is 16.0% of gross and 41.3% of variance, so a book that counts as nine effective bets by dollars is far narrower by risk. And 61.4% of daily variance is factor, led by an Investment (CMA) beta of −0.50, long aggressive growth against short conservative payers; that is a style bet in the coat of a stock picker.

Sample, method and fit.
MeasureValue
Regression sample5,405 trading days, 2005-01-04 to 2026-06-30
ModelFama–French five factors plus Carhart momentum, Newey–West standard errors
Gross exposure (all position sizes, either side)100% of capital
Net exposure (longs minus shorts)+30% of capital
Variance explained by the six factors61.4%
Idiosyncratic variance (specific to individual stocks)38.6%
Residual alpha, annualized, in sample+9.7%
t-statistic on residual alpha4.49
Risk contribution methodannualized covariance of the positions
Value-at-risk sample5,433 daily returns, historical simulation over one day, percent of capital
Stress methodrealized returns compounded at constant weights across each window

The portfolio

Table 1. The portfolio: ten positions by side and weight.
TickerSideWeight (% NAV)
NVDALong16.0%
AAPLLong13.0%
MSFTLong12.0%
GOOGLLong9.0%
AMZNLong8.0%
JPMLong7.0%
XOMShort−9.0%
KOShort−9.0%
PGShort−9.0%
DUKShort−8.0%
Gross 100% · Net +30%6 long / 4 short10 names

Factor decomposition

Table 2. Factor exposures (the Fama–French five factors plus momentum).
ExposureBook beta
Market (Mkt-RF)+0.56
Size (SMB)−0.03
Value (HML)−0.17
Profitability (RMW)−0.13
Investment (CMA)−0.50
Momentum (Mom)+0.03
Reading each exposure: intended or not.
ExposureBetaWhat it isVerdict
Market (Mkt-RF, the market return minus the risk-free rate)+0.56The shorts are defensives with low beta, so netting dollars did not net out direction; about 1.9× more directional than the net book impliesUnintended
Investment (conservative minus aggressive, CMA)−0.50Long tech among the mega caps, with heavy reinvestment, funded by short conservative payers. A style bet, not stock selectionUnintended
Value (high minus low, HML)−0.17Net short value, long growth. A style bet, not stock selectionUnintended
Profitability (robust minus weak, RMW)−0.13Mildly short quality; the shorts are the profitable defensives. A style bet, not stock selectionUnintended
Size (small minus big, SMB)−0.03Negligible; both sides of the book are large caps, so the book is correctly size neutralIntended (clean)

Concentration

Table 3. Concentration and volatility metrics.
MetricValue
Largest positionNVDA at 16.0% of gross
Herfindahl (HHI, normalized by gross)0.11
Effective number of bets (1/HHI)9.3
Annualized book volatility15.6%
Largest risk contributorNVDA at 41.3% of variance
Table 4. Dollar weight versus risk contribution, by name.
NameDollar weight (% gross)Share of risk
NVDA16.0%41.3%
AAPL13.0%18.6%
MSFT12.0%14.6%
AMZN8.0%13.0%
GOOGL9.0%12.0%
JPM7.0%7.7%
DUK8.0%−0.7%
KO9.0%−1.6%
PG9.0%−1.7%
XOM9.0%−3.2%

Loss

Value-at-risk is the loss exceeded on only 1% (or 5%) of days; expected shortfall is the mean loss on the days that breach it.

Table 5. Historical value-at-risk and expected shortfall over one day.
ConfidenceVaR over 1 dayExpected Shortfall over 1 day
99%2.67%3.29%
95%1.57%2.24%
Table 6. Historical stress windows.
ScenarioWindowBook returnDays
Worst single day2008-09-29−7.0%1
Mean of 10 worst market days2005–2026−3.3%10
Global Financial Crisis2008-09-01 → 2008-12-31−19.0%85
COVID crash2020-02-19 → 2020-03-23−4.8%24

The two crisis windows read against each other. The book gave back only −4.8% peak-to-trough in the COVID crash because its low-beta shorts fell alongside its longs; the −19.0% Global Financial Crisis loss is the same hidden market beta biting once the shorts stopped hedging.

Fixes

Findings and remedies.
IssueWhat the record saysFix
Hidden market beta0.56 market beta on +30% net dollars, roughly 1.9× more directional than the net book suggests, because every short is a defensive with low betaSize to a beta target rather than a dollar target, substituting shorts with higher beta or overlaying an index short until realized beta matches the intended net
Risk concentrated in one nameNVDA is 16.0% of gross dollars but 41.3% of portfolio variance; 9.3 effective bets by dollars, far fewer by riskCap the risk contribution of a single name, not only its weight, trimming NVDA or adding an offsetting position
A style bet in the coat of a stock pickerOnly 38.6% of daily variance is idiosyncratic; 61.4% is the six factors, led by an Investment (CMA) beta of −0.50Neutralize the CMA/growth tilt if the thesis is selection of single names, or own it deliberately as the strategy and budget risk to it

What this does not claim

The book is hypothetical and illustrative, constructed to be taken apart rather than traded, and is neither a real position nor a recommendation. Its universe is large caps that are survivors today, so the history carries hindsight about which names lived. Every in-sample figure, the residual alpha above all, is an upper bound rather than a forecast, measured on the same data the model was fitted to.

The teardown is the product. A book’s net exposure is easy to quote; the work is showing that +30% net dollars carry a 0.56 market beta, that 16.0% of gross is 41.3% of the risk, and that a book billed as stock selection is 61.4% factor by variance.

References

  1. Carhart, M. M. (1997). On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance. Journal of Finance, 52(1), 57–82.
  2. Fama, E. F., and French, K. R. (2015). A Five-Factor Asset Pricing Model. Journal of Financial Economics, 116(1), 1–22.
  3. Newey, W. K., and West, K. D. (1987). A Simple, Positive Semi-Definite, Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance Matrix. Econometrica, 55(3), 703–708.